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Counterpossibles
Alexander W. Kocurek∗ Forthcoming in Philosophy Compass
Abstract. A counterpossible is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Coun-
terpossibles present a puzzle for standard theories of counterfactuals, which pre-
dict that all counterpossibles are semantically vacuous. Moreover, counterpossi-
bles play an important role in many debates within metaphysics and epistemology,
including debates over grounding, causation, modality, mathematics, science, and
even God. In this article, we will explore various positions on counterpossibles as
well as their potential philosophical consequences.
1 Introduction
Counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are called counterpossibles.
Here are some examples of counterpossibles whose antecedents are impos-
sible in different senses:
(1) Metaphysical: If water were hydrogen peroxide, life would not exist.
(2) Logical: If the Liar were both true and not true, paraconsistent logic
would be correct.
(3) Mathematical: If Hobbes had squared the circle, he would have
ended world hunger.
(4) Conceptual: If colorless green ideas had existed, they would have
slept furiously.
It is standard to call a counterpossible whose antecedent is 𝑋ically impossi-
ble a “counter𝑋ical”; e.g., (1) is a countermetaphysical, (2) is a counterlogi-
cal, (3) is a countermathematical, and (4) is a counterconceptual.
Counterpossibles present a puzzle for theorists working on counterfac-
tuals. On the one hand, counterpossibles generally seem nontrivial and
informative. They certainly do not all seem equivalent to each other. This
can be seen by the fact that they seem to vary in truth value: intuitively, (1)
and (2) seem true, (3) seems false, and as for (4), who knows? Of course, our
intuitions could be mistaken about particular cases, but it seems plausible
that counterpossibles are not all necessarily equivalent.
∗Thanks to Rachel Rudolph and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments, as
well as Sara Bernstein for feedback on the discussion of omissive causation and Sam Elgin
for feedback on the discussion of the necessity of mathematics.
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On the other hand, the standard semantic accounts of counterfactuals
predict just that—in fact, they predict all counterpossibles are trivially true.
This is because they all analyze counterfactuals as (perhaps restricted) uni-
versal quantifiers over possible worlds: a counterfactual is true iff at all the
[closest/relevant/most similar. . . ] possible worlds where the antecedent is
true, the consequent is true. But for counterpossibles, there are no possi-
ble worlds where the antecedent is true. So vacuously, anything is true at
“all” of the [closest/relevant/most similar. . . ] possible worlds where the
antecedent is true. This is a general feature of universal quantifiers; e.g.,
if there are no zebras in my office, then vacuously, “all” of the zebras in
my office are wearing pants. Thus, as Lewis (1973a, p. 24) famously puts it,
“Confronted by an antecedent that is not really an entertainable supposi-
tion, one may react by saying, with a shrug: If that were so, anything you
like would be true!”
So our intuitions about counterpossibles conflict with the standard ac-
counts of counterfactuals. Something must give. . . but what? Are coun-
terpossibles all vacuously true, despite initial appearances? Or are they
genuine counterexamples to the standard accounts? More generally, are all
counterpossibles necessarily equivalent (e.g., all true, all false, all semanti-
cally defective. . . ), or can they differ semantically?
In what follows, we will explore different views on counterpossibles (§2)
as well as some of the reasons philosophers have given in defense of these
views (§3). As we’ll see, counterpossibles have important consequences
outside of semantics—e.g., for metaphysics, science, mathematics, and re-
ligion (§4). In closing, I’ll raise some further questions that remain for the
study of counterpossibles (§5).
There are two related kinds of conditionals that I set aside in what
follows. First, I set aside counterlegals (or counternomics), which have
“physically impossible” antecedents (e.g., “If something had traveled faster
than light,. . . ”). Typically, counterfactuals are only considered counterpos-
sibles when their antecedent is at least metaphysically impossible. And
while there are parallels between them, counterlegals do not raise the same
kinds of semantic vacuity puzzles as counterpossibles. Second, I set aside
indicatives with impossible antecedents. These raise similar puzzles as
counterpossibles and are also philosophically interesting.1 But there tends
to be less controversy over them since it is generally thought that nontrivial
indicatives only need epistemically possible antecedents.2
1See Nolan 2016 for an application to Curry’s paradox.
2See Bennett 2003, pp. 54–57. Possible exceptions include “reductio” indicatives (cf. the
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2 Views on Counterpossibles
Let’s start by charting the landscape. There are two main camps in the
debate over counterpossibles. According to vacuism, all counterpossibles
are vacuously (i.e., necessarily) true, despite appearances to the contrary.
Vacuism
If 𝐴 is impossible, then for any 𝐵, if 𝐴 were the case, 𝐵 would be the
case.
¬◇𝐴 ñ 𝐴 𝐵
Vacuists maintain that counterpossibles are semantically vacuous and ex-
plain the appearance of their nontriviality by appealing to pragmatics.3
According to nonvacuism, some counterpossibles are true while others
false. Nonvacuists maintain that counterpossibles are semantically nonvac-
uous and accommodate their nonvacuity by revising the standard semantic
accounts of counterfactuals.4
There are other positions available. For example, one might think
counterpossibles are all vacuously false. Or one might think the vacuism-
nonvacuism dichotomy is in some way too coarse. In this section, I lay out
some of the most prominent versions of vacuism (§2.1), nonvacuism (§2.2),
and various intermediate positions that have been proposed (§2.3).
2.1 Vacuism
Vacuists say that things are not as they seem: though counterpossibles
seem nontrivial, they are, in fact, all vacuously true. But why do they seem
discussion of reductio counterfactuals in §3.1) as well as indicatives encoding purported
necessary or a priori entailments. See also Dorst 2019, p. 1234.
3Popper (1959) is an early defender of vacuism in the literature, though the view is pre-
dominantly associated with Lewis (1973a). Other vacuists include: Stalnaker (1968, 1996);
Kratzer (1979); Bennett (2003); Emery and Hill (2017); Williamson (2007, 2017). Lycan (2001)
holds that counterpossibles are vacuous when the antecedent is known to be impossible.
Since the debate over counterpossibles is be between philosophers who (allegedly) know
the antecedents in question are impossible, it seems appropriate to classify Lycan as a vacuist
for current purposes. There was also discussion of a view like vacuism (but for indicatives)
in thirteenth-century Arabic logic (El-Rouayheb, 2009).
4Downing (1959) and Goddard and Routley (1973) are early nonvacuists (though Down-
ing was primarily concerned with counterlegals). Other nonvacuists include: Cohen (1987,
1990); Zagzebski (1990); Mares (1997); Nolan (1997); Merricks (2001); Goodman (2004); Van-
der Laan (2004); Kim and Maslen (2006); Krakauer (2012); Brogaard and Salerno (2013);
Kment (2014); Bernstein (2016); Berto et al. (2018); Jenny (2018); Tan (2019).
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nontrivial in the first place? Vacuists generally think that pragmatics can
explain the appearance of nontriviality.
Gricean Account. Emery and Hill (2017, pp. 138–139) explain the felt non-
triviality of counterpossibles as a Gricean implicature (Grice, 1975).5 Speak-
ers often assert trivially true sentences to communicate nontrivial informa-
tion. Example: your friend is worried about losing their upcoming race. In
an attempt to console them, you say, “Look. . . ”:
(5) If you lose, you lose.
Taken literally, (5) is a tautology; but obviously, you mean to say more than
that. The Gricean explanation is that speakers (perhaps implicitly) exploit
the “maxim of quantity”, which advises speakers to “be informative”. Hav-
ing heard you assert (5), your friend (perhaps implicitly) realizes that (5),
taken literally, is trivial and thus charitably searches for a nearby nontrivial
substitute (e.g., “Losing isn’t be a big deal”). Emery and Hill argue that a
similar story applies to counterpossibles.
One problem for this account is that implicatures arising from the maxim
of quantity tend to go away when the sentence in question is embedded in a
downward-entailing environment like negation or ‘doubts’ (Gazdar, 1979;
Horn, 1989; Chierchia, 2004). Thus, the following generally sound terrible:
(6) a. It’s not the case that if you lose, you lose.
b. I doubt that if you lose, you lose.
By contrast, counterpossibles under such environments sound fine:
(7) a. It’s not the case that if Hobbes had squared the circle, he would
have ended world hunger.
b. I doubt that if Hobbes had squared the circle, he would have
ended world hunger.
Moreover, such an account is incomplete without specific details concerning
what the implicature is and how it is generated (for further criticism, see
Sendłak 2019).
5Technically, Emery and Hill (2017) only present a Gricean account for “philosophi-
cally sophisticated” speakers, who know the antecedent in question is impossible. While
they think “philosophically unsophisticated” speakers also exploit pragmatic mechanisms
to communicate nontrivial information with counterpossibles, they decline to provide a
specific mechanism to explain this.
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Heuristics Account. Williamson (2007, p. 173) compares counterpossibles
with vacuous quantification. At first, (8) sounds false.
(8) Every golden mountain is a valley.
According to classical logic, however, (8) is true since there are no golden
mountains. The reason (8) sounds false is that we normally treat sentences
of the form “Every 𝐹 is 𝐺” and “Every 𝐹 is not 𝐺” as incompatible. Since
we judge (9) as obviously true, we treat (8) as false.
(9) Every golden mountain is a mountain (and so not a valley).
This heuristic generally works, but it leads us astray when there are no 𝐹s.
Similarly, Williamson (2017, p. 218) says we rely on the following heuris-
tic when evaluating counterfactuals:6
HCC
Given that 𝐵 and 𝐶 are inconsistent, treat 𝐴 𝐵 and 𝐴 𝐶 as
inconsistent.
On the standard accounts, HCC is reliable when 𝐴 is possible, but it leads
us astray when 𝐴 is impossible—for in that case, 𝐴𝐵 and 𝐴𝐶 are both
vacuously true. We naïvely judge (3) to be false because (10) is obviously
true. So we apply HCC and conclude (3) is false, even though HCC is
unreliable in this context.
(10) If Hobbes had squared the circle, he would not have ended world
hunger.
Berto et al. (2018, p. 707) argue that this strategy incorrectly predicts that
the following pair of counterlogicals should sound inconsistent:
(11) a. If it were raining and not raining, it would be raining.
b. If it were raining and not raining, it would not be raining.
However, Williamson is clear that “we are not completely helpless victims
of our heuristics” (p. 222). He claims that in (11), HCC is overridden by
our better senses. This makes it difficult to see what could constitute a
counterexample to the account (which may itself be a criticism).
Even if the heuristics account is correct, it still does not explain why
many philosophers judge some counterpossibles to be false, even when
they’re aware of the impossibility of the antecedent and are not inclined to
6I could not find out what “HCC” stands for.
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judge universally quantified claims with empty domains as false. Moreover,
this account needs to be furnished with an explanation of how we use
counterpossibles to nontrivially communicate. Perhaps one could fruitfully
combine the heuristics account and the Gricean account here, but the details
remain to be worked out.
2.2 Nonvacuism
Nonvacuists take our intuitions about counterpossibles at face value: coun-
terpossibles seem nontrivial because, in fact, they are! Since the standard
accounts predict otherwise, the standard accounts must go. But what re-
places them?
Typically, nonvacuists employ the following strategy: take your favorite
semantics for counterfactuals and just sprinkle in some impossible worlds.7
For example, on Lewis’s (1973a) semantics, a counterfactual is true iff at
all the “closest” (or most similar) possible worlds where the antecedent is
true, the consequent is true.8 A nonvacuist can take this account and just
drop the “possible” qualifier: at all the closest worlds (possible or otherwise)
where the antecedent is true, the consequent is true.9
Nowadays, few metaphysicians are worried about impossible worlds as
entities. Lewis (1986, p. 7) rejected them, since he thought other worlds are
as real as our own, so accepting impossible worlds into his ontology would
require him to admit that something impossible obtains in reality. But most
metaphysicians treat worlds as abstract or ersatz entities, e.g., maximally
specific propositions or sets of sentences in some world-making language.
So conceived, impossible worlds are no more metaphysically problematic
than possible worlds (Nolan, 1997, 2013).10
One challenge for the impossible worlds approach is to clarify the notion
7For alternative approaches, see Fine 2012; Schaffer 2016; Weiss 2017; Priest 2018; Wilson
2018; Leitgeb 2019. The impossible worlds approach is closely related to relevant logic
(Anderson and Belnap, 1975; Routley, 1989, 2019; Mares, 1997, 2004, 2020; Dunn and Re-
stall, 2002) and connexive logic (Wansing, 2020), which also have nonvacuist motivations.
However, as Nolan (1997) observes, one does not need to revise classical logic to utilize
impossible worlds for this purpose.
8For ease of exposition, I’m simplifying Lewis’s account by setting aside worries about the
Limit Assumption. Interestingly, Lewis (1973b, pp. 430–431) considers adding “impossible
limit-worlds” to his account in order to preserve the Limit Assumption, but ultimately rejects
the proposal. See Vander Laan 2004, pp. 272–274 for related discussion.
9For more on how to implement this idea formally, see Brogaard and Salerno 2013; Berto
et al. 2018; Kocurek and Jerzak 2021.
10At any rate, impossible worlds are useful beyond counterpossibles. See Berto and Jago
2018, 2019; Berto and Nolan 2021 for discussion.
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of “closeness” or “similarity” for impossible worlds: when is one impossible
world closer to the actual world than another? Of course, it’s unclear how
to gauge similarity even amongst possible worlds, but to many, it’s more
mysterious for impossible worlds. Arguably, context-sensitivity plays some
role in addressing this concern (Nolan, 1997; Vander Laan, 2004), but there
have been several attempts to articulate more specific and systematic simi-
larity metrics with varying success (Krakauer, 2012; Brogaard and Salerno,
2013; Kment, 2014; Baras, 2019).
Here’s a related question: could an impossible world be closer than some
possible world? Nolan (1997, p. 555) discusses the following constraint on
closeness that answers in the negative:
Strangeness of Impossibility
No impossible world is as close to the actual world as any possible
world.
In the impossible worlds framework, this corresponds to the following prin-
ciple (French et al., 2020):11
◇𝐴,◻ 𝐵 ñ 𝐴 𝐵
Some nonvacuists endorse this constraint (Mares, 1997; Krakauer, 2012;
Jago, 2014; Kment, 2014).12 Others reject it (Nolan, 1997, 2017; Vander Laan,
2004; Bernstein, 2016; Clarke-Doane, 2017). Here’s a potential counterex-
ample:
(12) If Lewis were right about the metaphysics of possible worlds, modal
realism would be false.
The consequent of (12) is (let’s assume) necessarily true. Furthermore, the
antecedent is technically possible: Lewis could have believed modal realism
is false. Yet there’s some temptation to say (12) is false, at least on one
natural reading: when we evaluate it, we’re holding fixed what Lewis’s
views actually were, even though doing so takes us to an impossible world.
If this is correct, then Strangeness of Impossibility fails.13
11By “correspond”, I mean frame correspondence: an impossible worlds frame validates
◇𝐴,◻ 𝐵 ñ 𝐴 𝐵 iff it satisfies Strangeness of Impossibility. (This is the same sense in
which, e.g., the T axiom (◻𝐴 Ñ 𝐴) corresponds to reflexivity in standard modal logic.)
Also, while French et al. (2020) ignore logically impossible worlds in their models, the
correspondence result holds even if one includes them.
12Berto et al. (2018) seem to express sympathy towards Strangeness of Impossibility, but
do not explicitly endorse it.
13In conversation, several people have raised the concern that there’s some sort of equiv-
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2.3 Intermediate Views
The labels “vacuism” and “nonvacuism” misleadingly suggest these are the
only two options. On the contrary, there are views that do not fall neatly
on either side of this divide. Here, I mention three such views: one that
says counterpossibles are vacuously false, and two that say vacuism and
nonvacuism are correct for different “readings” of counterfactuals.
Absurdism. According to vacuism, all counterpossibles are vacuously true.
By contrast, according to what we might call absurdism, most or all coun-
terpossibles are absurd, i.e., vacuously false.14 (I say “most or all” because
absurdists may want to make an exception for counterfactuals of the form
𝐴 𝐴, which even nonvacuists tend to think are trivially true.)
Though absurdism directly conflicts with vacuism, there’s a sense in
which the two views are interchangeable (Lewis, 1973a, p. 25). Given a
vacuist conditional, we can define an absurdist conditional and vice
versa (setting aside the 𝐴 “ 𝐶 case).
𝐴 𝐶 ô ◇𝐴 ^ p𝐴 𝐶q
𝐴 𝐶 ô ◇𝐴 Ñ p𝐴 𝐶q.
Still, there may be reasons to prefer absurdism to vacuism. For one, there’s
some temptation to think anything could happen if the impossible had ob-
tained (Cohen, 1990, p. 125).15 As further motivation, Hájek (ms, 2020a,b)
ocation between “de re” and “de dicto” readings of (12) (as in “if Lewis’s actual views were
such that they were right. . . ” vs. “if Lewis had the right view (whatever it were). . . ”). On
the former, (12) has an impossible antecedent; on the latter, (12) seems true. Vander Laan
(2004, p. 271) gives an example that seems to avoid this worry. A graduate student writes a
program that searches for proofs of a contradiction in Peano Arithmetic and is instructed to
print “Contradiction!” upon finding one. In this context, the following seems false:
(i) If this computer program were to print “Contradiction!”, Peano Arithmetic would
be consistent.
Yet the antecedent is possible, since the computer could go haywire. We presumably hold
fixed the fact that it won’t go haywire when evaluating (i). Moreover, “this computer
program” clearly refers to the actual lines of code the graduate student wrote. See Nolan
2017, p. 29 for another example.
14I have not found anyone who has endorsed (what I’m calling) absurdism in the literature.
Lowe (1995, p. 49) has a view that comes close, though he explicitly rejects absurdism.
According to Lowe, 𝐴𝐵 is equivalent to◻p𝐴Ñ𝐵q^p◇𝐴_◻ 𝐵q, i.e., counterfactuals are
strict conditionals plus the addition of a kind of “nonvacuity” clause. So on Lowe’s view,
counterpossibles are true only when their consequents are necessary; otherwise, they’re
false. This means Lowe rejects 𝐴 𝐴 for counterpossibles.
15For this to support absurdism, however, we need to assume Duality (see §3.2).
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has recently defended counterfactual skepticism, according to which most
ordinary counterfactuals are false. Though Hájek is officially neutral on
whether counterpossibles are an exception, counterfactual skeptics might
be tempted to extend their view to counterpossibles as well.16
Epistemic Nonvacuism. It is well known that counterfactuals give rise to
so-called “epistemic” readings (Edgington, 2008). Example: a detective has
narrowed the suspects down to Jones and Smith. She has both brought in
for questioning, and determines Jones must be the culprit, as Smith was in
a different country at the time of the crime. When asked why she had both
Jones and Smith brought in, she says:
(13) If it hadn’t been Jones, it would have been Smith.
In this context, (13) seems true—it’s exactly why the detective brought Smith
in for questioning! But there’s also a way of hearing (13) on which it’s false:
if it hadn’t been Jones, Smith still would have been in a different country,
and so couldn’t have been the culprit. Put differently: (13) is true on its
epistemic reading, whereas it’s false on its circumstantial reading. The
former concerns what follows from the detective’s evidence, whereas the
latter instead concerns (among other things) the causal facts (Khoo, 2015).
Vetter (2016a) argues that while counterpossibles are nontrivial on their
epistemic reading, they are vacuous on their circumstantial reading. We
might call this epistemic nonvacuism. She postulates that the principle of
the substitution of identicals can distinguish these readings: expressions
that violate the substitution of identicals are interpreted epistemically (Vet-
ter, 2016b, p. 2698). But many of the apparently nontrivial counterpossibles
seem to violate this principle (more on this in §3.1). Thus, when we intuit
a counterpossible as false, we are interpreting it epistemically (for critical
discussion, see Locke 2019; Kocurek 2020; Dohrn 2021).
Counterconventional Nonvacuism. It seems tautologous to say that we al-
ways evaluate truth at a scenario using the linguistic conventions we actually
adopt (Kripke, 1971, 1980). However, there are cases where counterfactuals
seem to shift the conventions used to evaluate truth at a scenario (Einheuser,
2006; Kocurek et al., 2020). Example: in 2006, astronomers redefined the
16It’s interesting to observe that at least one of his arguments (the argument from the
indeterminacy of antecedents) seems to carry over to counterpossibles. This suggests that
Hájek’s brand of counterfactual skepticism would naturally lend itself to absurdism, even if
he is not forced to accept this view.
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word ‘planet’ so that Pluto no longer counted as a planet. They did this be-
cause many other objects in the solar system had physical properties similar
to Pluto and they wanted to avoid a proliferation in the number of planets.
(Many were upset by this decision.) Now, consider:
(14) If Pluto were a planet, dozens of other objects would also be planets.
In this context, (14) seems true—it’s exactly why the astronomers felt the
need to invent a new definition! But there’s also a way of hearing (14) on
which it’s false: Pluto is so small and far away that if its physical traits
were changed just enough to qualify it as a planet (according to the actual
definition), it would still have no effect on these other objects. Put differently:
(14) is true on its counterconventional reading, whereas it’s false on its
countersubstratum reading. The former involves shifting the conventional
interpretation of an expression (e.g., ‘planet’), whereas the latter holds fixed
our conventions and shifts only worldly facts (“the substratum”).
Kocurek and Jerzak (2021) argue that counter(meta)logicals are vacuous
on their countersubstratum reading. For example, assuming classical logic
is correct, (15) is a counter(meta)logical. And at first, it seems false since
intuitionistic logic rejects the law of excluded middle.
(15) If intuitionistic logic were correct, the continuum hypothesis would
be either true or not true.
But if we hold fixed what we actually mean by logical words like ‘not’ and ‘or’
in the consequent, then (15) is true (assuming we actually endorse classical
logic): in the counterfactual scenario where intuitionistic logic is correct, it’s
still the case that according to our actual (classical) interpretation of ‘not’
and ‘or’, either the continuum hypothesis is true or it’s not. By contrast,
even holding fixed our conventions, (16) is still false:
(16) If intuitionistic logic were correct, the sentence “The continuum hy-
pothesis is either true or not true” would be true.
This suggests the nonvacuous reading of (15) requires shifting the con-
ventions governing logical vocabulary away from those we actually adopt.
Later, Kocurek and Jerzak consider extending this view to other counter-
possibles, including countermetaphysicals (cf. Locke 2019; Muñoz 2020).
We might call such a view counterconventional nonvacuism.
Note: this is not the view that counterpossibles are “metalinguistic” in
the sense that they’re about language. For example, the view distinguishes
between (15) and (16) above. Rather, the view is that nonvacuous counter-
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possibles involve shifting the conventions used to interpret language.17 In
this sense, counterpossibles are no more “about” language than quantifica-
tional claims are “about” variable assignments.18
3 Arguments
Let’s now turn to some arguments for and against these various positions.
Even though vacuism has been considered the “orthodox” position for quite
some time, it is prima facie counterintuitive, whereas nonvacuism arguably
has claim to being the more “intuitive” position. For this reason, most
arguments presented in the literature are directed against nonvacuism (§3.1).
Still, nonvacuists have given some positive arguments in favor of their view
besides simply appealing to linguistic intuition (§3.2).
3.1 Arguments for Vacuism
Strict Entailment. The following principle is initially plausible.
Strict Entailment
If 𝐴 necessarily entails 𝐵, then if 𝐴 were the case, 𝐵 would be the
case.
◻p𝐴 Ñ 𝐵q ñ 𝐴 𝐵
For example, (17) seems valid:19
(17) a. Necessarily, if cats are purple, they are colored.
b. Therefore, if cats were purple, they would be colored.
But Strict Entailment entails Vacuism, since 𝐴 necessarily entails everything
if 𝐴 is impossible (Lewis, 1973a; Zagzebski, 1990).20
17This is why the argument in Brogaard and Salerno 2013, pp. 644–645 does not apply to
this view. See Jenny 2018, p. 541 for a similar point.
18Compare this with distinction between counterfactuals being representation-sensitive
vs. about representations on page 14.
19Here, I am assuming we can analyze (17a) using the material conditional Ñ. While
it is highly controversial whether the English indicative can be faithfully analyzed as the
material conditional in general, it seems reasonable in the case of necessitated conditionals
like (17a). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
20In fact, Vacuism also entails Strict Entailment modulo an additional assumption:
Counterfactual Reductio
◇𝐴, p𝐴 ^ ¬ 𝐵qK ñ 𝐴 𝐵.
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Nonvacuists tend to say two things in response. First, counterpossibles
seem to directly undermine the intuitions supporting Strict Entailment. For
example, (18) strikes many as specious:
(18) a. Necessarily, Hobbes did not square the circle.
b. Therefore, if Hobbes had squared the circle, he would have
ended world hunger.
Second, our intuitions about Strict Entailment can be vindicated if all the
standard principles of counterfactual reasoning hold for counterfactuals
with possible antecedents. This could explain why (17) sounds fine, whereas
(18) does not (Berto et al., 2018).
These responses are reasonable but not decisive. First, if we reformulate
(18) more directly as an instance of Strict Entailment, as in (19), it sounds
less bad (at least to me). So perhaps (18) sounds odd only because people
find it counterintuitive that impossibilities necessarily entail everything, not
because Strict Entailment fails.21
(19) a. Necessarily, if Hobbes squared the circle, he ended world hunger.
b. Therefore, if Hobbes had squared the circle, he would have
ended world hunger.
Second, some nonvacuists reject Strict Entailment even when the antecedent
is possible. In particular, notice that Strangeness of Impossibility follows
from Strict Entailment, even when the latter is restricted to possible an-
Proof: Suppose ◻p𝐴 Ñ 𝐵q is true, i.e., ¬◇p𝐴 ^ ¬ 𝐵q is true. Either◇𝐴 is true or ¬◇𝐴 is
true. If ◇𝐴 is true, then since ¬◇p𝐴 ^ ¬ 𝐵q is true, p𝐴 ^ ¬ 𝐵q K is true by Vacuism.
Hence, 𝐴 𝐵 follows by Counterfactual Reductio. If ¬◇𝐴 is true, then 𝐴 𝐵 follows
directly from Vacuism. QED. As far as I am aware, Counterfactual Reductio has not been
discussed in the literature, though it seems like a principle many nonvacuists would be
sympathetic to (especially if they endorse Strangeness of Impossibility).




◻p𝐵 Ñ 𝐶q, 𝐴 𝐵 ñ 𝐴 𝐶
21Nonvacuists could also explain this by appealing to context-sensitivity: by mentioning
world hunger in (19a), one changes what worlds are relevantly similar to the actual world.
Thus, in normal contexts, (19b) is false, but in asserting (19a), one changes the contextual
parameters for assessing the truth of the counterfactual in such a way so as to guarantee
(19b) is true. This could be an alternative explanation for why Strict Entailment seems like
a good principle in most cases.
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tecedents. Thus, those who reject Strangeness of Impossibility will say Strict
Entailment can fail even for counterfactuals with possible antecedents.
No Counterfactual Logic. Nolan (1997, p. 554) has argued that nonvacuism
challenges the validity of most, if not all, nontrivial principles of counter-
factual reasoning (cf. Cohen 1990, p. 131).22 For example, you might think
that the following principle of counterfactual reasoning is solid:
Separation
If 𝐵 and 𝐶 would be the case were 𝐴 the case, then 𝐵 would be the
case were 𝐴 the case, and 𝐶 would be the case were 𝐴 the case.
𝐴 p𝐵 ^ 𝐶q ñ p𝐴 𝐵q ^ p𝐴 𝐶q
But here’s a potential counterexample:
(20) a. If every instance of conjunction elimination had failed, both
Priya and Quinn would be sad.
b. Therefore, if every instance of conjunction elimination had failed,
Priya would be sad.
If we accept (20a), then it seems we shouldn’t accept (20b), as this would
employ the very principle whose failure is being supposed. Examples like
this can be generated for nearly any principle of counterfactual reasoning
that isn’t an instance of a noncounterfactual validity.
Some nonvacuists embrace this consequence (Cohen, 1990; Nolan, 1997).
Others try to resist it. A common feature of examples like (20) is that
they involve counter(meta)logicals. This suggests nonvacuists can avoid
this result by maintaining counter(meta)logicals are vacuously true, even if
countermetaphysicals are generally nonvacuous (Goodman, 2004; Kment,
2014). Alternatively, one may impose constraints on closeness to generate
a nontrivial logic for counterfactuals (Berto et al., 2018). Finally, epistemic
and counterconventional nonvacuists could, in theory, maintain a nontrivial
logic for counterfactuals on some readings while rejecting a nontrivial logic
on others (Kocurek and Jerzak, 2021).
22One major exception Nolan considers is Identity (see footnote 20). However, he suggests
the following might be a counterexample to Identity (p. 555):
(i) If nothing were true, nothing would be true.




Substitution of Identicals. Williamson (2007, pp. 174–175) observes that non-
vacuists reject (21), which is an instance of the substitution of identicals.
(21) a. If Hesperus weren’t Phosphorus, Hesperus would still be Hesperus.
b. Hesperus is Phosphorus.
c. Therefore, if Hesperus weren’t Phosphorus, Hesperus would
still be Phosphorus.
Yet the substitution of identicals generally seems plausible for counterfac-
tuals. For instance, the following inference seems valid:
(22) a. If the rocket had continued on its course, it would have hit
Hesperus.
b. Hesperus is Phosphorus.
c. Therefore, if the rocket had continued on its course, it would
have hit Phosphorus.
Williamson defends the validity of the substitution of identicals for coun-
terfactuals: “it matters not that different names are used, because the coun-
terfactuals are not about such representational features” (cf. Vetter 2016a,
p. 2698). Yet, he argues, nonvacuism must deny this.
Nonvacuists tend to agree they must reject the substitution of identicals.
One response to (22) is to say that the substitution of identicals is valid when
one adds the premise that the antecedents of the relevant counterfactuals
are possible (Brogaard and Salerno, 2013; Berto et al., 2018).23 Another is to
say that the substitution of identicals is valid when the antecedents coun-
terfactually imply the identity claim (Kocurek, 2020). Thus, the premise
needed to make (22) valid is not “It is possible the rocket continued on its
course” but rather “If the rocket had continued on its course, Hesperus
would still be Phosphorus”.
The claim that nonvacuism implies counterfactuals are “about repre-
sentational features” is misleading at best. Distinguish between a sentence
being about representations and being sensitive to representations. The former
concerns the subject matter of a sentence. The latter concerns how the truth
conditions of a sentence are determined. Nonvacuists are only committed
23Williamson (2017, pp. 210–211) objects that this sort of view is ad hoc: “counterfactuals
behave in radically different ways depending on the modal status of their antecedent: trans-
parently, like a non-epistemic operator, if it is possible, opaquely, like an epistemic operator,
if it is impossible. That suggests an implausibly hybrid semantics. A more uniform treat-
ment is much to be preferred.” A nonvacuist could deny their semantics is “implausibly
hybrid”. Kocurek (2020) argues that the nonvacuist should adopt a uniform treatment in
which all counterfactuals are opaque regardless of the antecedent’s status.
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to counterfactuals being sensitive to representations: counterfactuals may
receive different truth conditions upon substituting one expression with a
necessarily equivalent expression. They are not committed to counterfac-
tuals being about representations in any interesting sense (Kocurek 2020,
pp. 623–624; cf. Berto and Jago 2019, pp. 278–279). For example, (21a) and
(21c) are not about names: they’re about celestial bodies. That’s compati-
ble with them receiving different truth conditions despite differing only in
which of some coreferring names occur in the consequent.24
Thinking It Through. Our intuitions about counterpossibles start to break
down once we think them through (Williamson, 2007, p. 172). Imagine I
just finished taking a quiz. I wrote “11” as the answer to “5 ` 7 “?”. In this
context, (23) sounds false.
(23) If 5 ` 7 were 13, I would have given the right answer.
But Williamson observes: “If 5 ` 7 were 13 then 5 ` 6 would be 12, and so
(by another eleven steps) 0 would be 1, so if the number of right answers
I gave were 0, the number of right answers I gave would be 1.” Thus, we
reason our way to the truth of (23) after all.
Nonvacuists tend to deny that counterpossibles are closed under such
reasoning: if 5`7 were 13, the laws of arithmetic would have been different.
So we can’t assume standard arithmetic applies under such countermath-
ematical suppositions. (This doesn’t mean we can never appeal to such
reasoning under these suppositions; it just means we can’t always.)
Furthermore, it’s hard to see how to apply Williamson’s argument to
countermetaphysicals such as (1). There’s no straightforward way of rea-
soning from “Water is hydrogen peroxide” to any arbitrary conclusion since
it is not a priori impossible. (We can’t just apply explosion to the antecedent,
since this makes use of Strict Entailment, which nonvacuists reject.)
Reductio Counterfactuals. Here is a related concern. Mathematicians often
use countermathematicals when reasoning by reductio. For example, here’s
a proof that there’s no largest prime number:
(24) If 𝑝 were the largest prime number, then 𝑝! ` 1 would be composite
(since 𝑝! ` 1 is larger than 𝑝) and 𝑝! ` 1 would be prime (since 𝑛! ` 1
is prime for any 𝑛). Contradiction.
24Compare this with grounding claims, which are also taken to be sensitive to represen-
tations without being about representations (Raven, 2015, p. 327).
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One rarely (if ever) needs to use counterpossibles to articulate such reason-
ing; one could just as well use the material conditional. But one is generally
permitted to articulate reductio reasoning using counterfactuals.
Williamson (2017, p. 214) argues that nonvacuists have trouble predict-
ing that such reductio counterfactuals are true. In response to the “thinking
it through” objection, nonvacuists say that one cannot apply ordinary math-
ematical reasoning under countermathematical suppositions such as in (23).
Yet this is precisely what one must be able to do to render (24) true.
Nonvacuists may counter that vacuists have trouble predicting that such
reductio counterfactuals are nontrivial. In mathematical proofs, one tries to
rely as little as possible on pragmatics and to instead communicate what
one means directly and literally. According to vacuists, however, reduc-
tio counterfactuals are literally vacuous. So how could they be useful in
communicating nontrivial steps in a proof?
In the end, each side has a reasonable but incomplete account of reductio
counterfactuals (cf. Kim and Maslen 2006, p. 101). Nonvacuists argue that
in the context of mathematical proofs, speakers hold fixed mathematical
facts, and so can apply mathematical reasoning within countermathemat-
ical suppositions (Berto et al., 2018, p. 704). The challenge is then to pro-
vide independent evidence for such context-dependence and explain why
it’s hard to hear reductio counterfactuals as false even outside these con-
texts (Williamson, 2017, p. 214). Vacuists argue that even though reductio
counterfactuals are trivially true, there are nontrivial constraints on when
such conditionals are assertible, even in mathematical proofs (Lewis 1973a,
pp. 24–25; Wierenga 1998, pp. 95–98; Williamson 2007, p. 173; Yli-Vakkuri
and Hawthorne 2020, pp. 569–571). The challenge is then to spell out these
constraints and the underlying pragmatic mechanisms in detail (Lampert,
2019, pp. 704–705). This is an area where further research is needed on both
sides.
3.2 Arguments for Nonvacuism
Counterpossibles in Philosophy. Philosophers often debate over theses that
are noncontingent. For example, most philosophers agree that either ab-
stract objects necessarily exist, or they necessarily do not exist. Each side
wants to draw problematic consequences from the other’s view. Often,
this is done through counterpossibles (“If abstract objects had (not) ex-
isted. . . ”). This suggests that nonvacuism is implicitly presupposed in
many philosophical disputes (Nolan, 1997; Merricks, 2001; Kim and Maslen,
2006; Brogaard and Salerno, 2013).
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One rarely (if ever) needs to use counterpossibles in these disputes; one
could just as well use the material (or perhaps indicative) conditional. But
philosophers generally feel permitted to use counterpossibles to draw out
consequences of noncontingent views. Unsurprisingly, this raises similar
issues to those raised concerning reductio counterfactuals. So vacuists
could accommodate counterpossibles in philosophy if they can provide a
plausible pragmatics for counterpossibles more generally.
Duality. Both of the following principles governing “could-counterfactuals”
(i.e., counterfactuals of the form “If 𝐴 were the case, 𝐵 could/might be the
case”) seem plausible at first.
Duality
Could-counterfactuals are the dual of would-counterfactuals.
𝐴 𝐵 ô ¬p𝐴 ¬ 𝐵q
Would Entails Could
Would-counterfactuals entail their could-counterparts.
𝐴 𝐵 ñ 𝐴 𝐵
Yet these principles conflict for counterpossibles (Zagzebski, 1990; Van-
der Laan, 2004). Even nonvacuists maintain the sentences in (11) are true.
(11) a. If it were raining and not raining, it would be raining.
b. If it were raining and not raining, it would not be raining.
By Would Entails Could, these entail:
(25) a. If it were raining and not raining, it might be raining.
b. If it were raining and not raining, it might not be raining.
But by Duality, the sentences in (11) also contradict the sentences in (25).
The standard vacuist semantics validates Duality, and so invalidates
Would Entails Could. Many nonvacuists have found this implausible, since
the sentences in (25) seem true, and instead reject Duality (Cohen, 1987,
1990; Zagzebski, 1990; Vander Laan, 2004).
Vacuists have two responses available, both of which seem viable. First,
they can explain away the plausibility of Would Entails Could since Would
Entails Could only fails for counterpossibles on the standard semantics. Sec-
ond, they can reject Duality on independent grounds (Mandelkern, 2019).
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This would require giving up the standard semantic accounts, but not nec-
essarily in a way that entails giving up vacuism.
Counterpossibles in Science. Some nonvacuists have argued that counter-
possibles figure in scientific explanations. Tan (2019) gives examples of
countermetaphysicals in physical explanations.25 For instance, diamond is
a poor electrical conductor because it is covalently bonded. Thus:
(26) If diamond had not been covalently bonded, it would have been a
better electrical conductor.
Yet diamond is necessarily covalently bonded: that’s what differentiates
diamond from (say) graphene, both of which are made of carbon. Another
set of examples come from idealization (p. 46). Though water is (necessarily)
composed of discrete molecules, it is useful to idealize and treat water as a
continuous incompressible medium so that it conforms to the Navier-Stokes
equations. That is, this idealization assumption is useful because:
(27) If water were a continuous incompressible medium, it would behave
in accordance with the Navier-Stokes equations.
Jenny (2018) argues that countermathematicals are needed to under-
stand relative computability theory. Some problems are “algorithmically
decidable”, meaning they can at least in principle be solved using an algo-
rithm. Others, such as the halting problem, are not.26 But some problems
become algorithmically decidable given the answer to other problems. For
example, the validity problem for first-order logic is undecidable, yet de-
cidable given the answer to the halting problem.27 Jenny argues that the
notion of relative computability is counterfactual: a problem 𝑃 is algorith-
mically decidable relative to 𝑄 iff 𝑃 would be algorithmically decidable were
𝑄 decidable. Such (what I’ll call) countercomputables are counterpossi-
bles: algorithms are abstract objects, and so the existence of an algorithm
that solves this-or-that problem is a noncontingent matter.
These authors are not just claiming that scientists utter counterpossibles
when explaining certain concepts or predictions of their theories. Rather,
25Similar examples are anticipated by Jenkins and Nolan (2012, pp. 743–745), though they
do not discuss these in the context of scientific explanations in particular.
26Roughly, the halting problem is the problem of determining whether a given algorithm
will halt on a given input.
27The validity problem is the problem of determining whether a given formula in first-
order logic is valid.
18
4 Philosophical Applications
they claim that counterpossibles are ineliminable to scientific theories and
explanations. For instance, Tan (2019, pp. 42–43) argues that (26) is necessary
for explaining why diamond is a poor conductor. Similarly, Jenny (2018)
argues that the notion of relative computability that theorists are studying
is the countercomputable one. If correct, this would be a strong argument
in favor of nonvacuism.
One could argue that the use of counterpossibles in these contexts is
largely pedagogical (cf. Baron et al. 2020, p. 3). This would still lend some
support to nonvacuism, though it raises similar issues to those concerning
counterpossibles in philosophy. Part of the debate, however, is over what
it takes to give a complete explanation (Tan, 2019, p. 43), or over what
concepts the scientists are aiming to investigate (Jenny, 2018, pp. 544–545),
and whether these implicitly require nonvacuous counterpossibles.
4 Philosophical Applications
In the previous section, we examined a number of arguments for and against
the two main camps (vacuism and nonvacuism). The end result seems in-
conclusive: each side has some support and there aren’t yet any definitive
arguments favoring one view over the other. This naturally raises the ques-
tion: what hangs on this debate? Quite a lot, as it turns out. In this
section, we’ll explore several applications of vacuism and nonvacuism to
philosophical issues.
4.1 Applications of Vacuism
Modal Epistemology. Given that some necessary truths are not a priori
knowable (Kripke, 1971, 1980; Yablo, 1993), how can we know whether
something is metaphysically possible? Some philosophers have argued we
can’t (van Inwagen, 1998; Nozick, 2003). Others have tried to salvage the a
priori knowability of (at least a large swathe of) necessary truths, despite
the existence of necessary a posteriori truths (Chalmers, 2002).
Williamson (2007, ch. 5) defends a counterfactual account of modal epis-
temology (cf. Hill 2006; Kroedel 2012). It seems plausible that we generally
have the ability to know counterfactuals. Yet, on the standard semantic
accounts, necessity and possibility are equivalent to counterfactuals:
Counterfactual Definition of Modality
◻𝐴 ô ¬𝐴 K
◇𝐴 ô ¬p𝐴 Kq
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In fact, Counterfactual Definition of Modality follows from Strict Entailment
together with the following principle (cf. Strangeness of Impossibility):
Possibility Entailment
Suppose 𝐴 is possible, and that if 𝐴 were the case, 𝐵 would be the
case. Then 𝐵 is possible.
◇𝐴, 𝐴 𝐵 ñ ◇ 𝐵
Assuming that K is remains explosive in counterfactuals (so that 𝐴 K
entails 𝐴 𝐵 for any 𝐵), Counterfactual Definition of Modality entails
Vacuism: if 𝐴 is impossible, then 𝐴 K is true.28
Williamson uses Counterfactual Definition of Modality to argue that we
can know what’s possible by coming to know a certain (negated) counter-
factual. Hence, we do not need to postulate a special cognitive faculty to
explain how we know what’s metaphysical possible: that faculty falls out
of our general ability to know counterfactuals.
One source of criticism for Williamson’s account concerns whether it
is adequate as a modal epistemology (Jenkins, 2008; Malmgren, 2011; Pea-
cocke, 2011; Lowe, 2012; Tahko, 2012; Clarke-Doane, 2017). For instance,
one could question whether we really do have the general capacity to know
counterfactuals, or wonder whether a special faculty is needed to come to
know counterfactuals of the form ¬p𝐴 Kq. Another source of criticism
concerns whether the account requires vacuism. Berto et al. (2018) argue
that if we interpret “K” to mean “an impossibility obtains”, nonvacuists
can accept Counterfactual Definition of Modality (cf. Kment 2006, 2014).
On this account, the path from Counterfactual Definition of Modality to
Vacuism is blocked by interpreting “K” in a way that’s not explosive in
counterfactuals.29
Dispositionalism. According to dispositionalism (or potentialism), meta-
physical modality is analyzed in terms of dispositions (or “potentialities”):
it is possible that 𝑃 iff (roughly) something has a disposition whose manifes-
tation consists in 𝑃 (Borghini and Williams, 2008; Jacobs, 2010; Vetter, 2015,
2016a,b, 2018). Of course, dispositionalists also want to analyze counterfac-
tuals in terms of dispositions. A natural proposal is this: a counterfactual
28Alternatively, we may replace ¬𝐴  K with a propositionally quantified claim
@𝑝p¬𝐴 𝑝q and achieve a similar effect (though see Berto et al. 2018, p. 710).
29Note: because of the counterfactual definition of◇, Berto et al.’s (2018) account requires
Possibility Entailment (assuming that ¬◇ 𝐵, 𝐴 𝐵 ñ 𝐴K, which is plausible given K
means “an impossibility obtains”).
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is true iff (roughly) all the relevant systems that have a disposition whose
stimulus consists in the antecedent are such that the manifestation of that
disposition consists in the consequent (Vetter, 2016a, p. 2683).30
On this account, if nonvacuism is true, then some objects must have
dispositions whose stimulus—and so, arguably, whose manifestation—
consists in an impossibility. Some have directly defended the existence
of such dispositions (Jenkins and Nolan, 2012). But this directly contradicts
the right-to-left direction of the dispositionalist’s analysis of possibility.
Thus, dispositionalism seems to require vacuism. Vetter (2016a) defends
this by arguing for epistemic nonvacuism (§2.3): counterpossibles are only
nonvacuous on their epistemic reading, which is irrelevant for the dispo-
sitionalist’s analysis of metaphysical modality (for critical discussion, see
Wang 2015; Yates 2015; Leech 2017).
Necessity of Mathematics. Many agree that mathematical truths are neces-
sary.31 But what justifies this claim? Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (2020)
argue that mathematical practice is committed to the necessity of mathemati-
cal truths. Their argument is based on the observation that counterfactuals
are often deployed in mathematical practice. Using Counterfactual Defi-
nition of Modality, they then argue that all truths stated in the language
of pure mathematics are necessary: mathematical practice, they claim, is
committed to the “informal provability” of ¬𝐴 K (and thus, ◻𝐴) from
𝐴, where “informal provability” means “there is a proof of it in the sense of
‘proof’ operative in actual mathematical practice” (pp. 556–558).
Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s argument does not strictly require vacuism:
it only requires the inference from ¬𝐴 K to ◻𝐴, which follows from
Possibility Entailment (p. 561). Still, they express vacuist sympathies and
give a heuristics-based account of apparently false countermathematicals
(pp. 566–571). Furthermore, nonvacuists who reject Strangeness of Impos-
sibility tend to reject Possibility Entailment anyway.32
One worry for Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s account is that counterfac-
tuals in pure mathematics seem dispensable in that they could always be
30See Vetter 2015, pp. 226–227 for an alternative analysis that starts from could-
counterfactuals.
31Though see Field 1993; Colyvan 2000; Clarke-Doane 2017 for exceptions.
32Note, Strangeness of Impossibility and Possibility Entailment are not equivalent. The
latter corresponds to the constraint that if 𝐴 is possible, then the closest 𝐴-worlds include
some possible worlds (what French et al. (2020) call the “MCP” condition). One could
maintain this, but deny that if 𝐴 is possible, then the closest 𝐴-worlds are all possible.
Still, those who accept one tend to accept the other. Nonvacuists might appeal to context-
dependence to say Possibility Entailment is licensed in the context of mathematical proofs
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replaced with material conditionals (cf. our earlier discussion of reductio
on page 15). Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne deny this, saying such counterfac-
tuals are indispensable for the application of mathematics, and that “[t]he
success of our practice of applying mathematics to anything whatsoever re-
quires that we know that mathematical truths would remain true under any
counterfactual suppositions whatsoever” (p. 562). As we discussed earlier,
some nonvacuists explicitly deny this (Berto et al., 2018, p. 704). Further-
more, as Elgin (2021, §4) observes, the indispensability claim is in tension
with the logic of counterfactuals Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne adopt, on
which counterfactuals are (informally provably) equivalent to the material
conditional. Of course, that’s only for counterfactuals within the language
of pure mathematics, but that’s precisely what’s at issue when justifying the
necessity of mathematics.
4.2 Applications of Nonvacuism
Grounding. Metaphysical grounding claims both support and are diag-
nosable by counterfactuals (Schaffer 2016; Wilson 2018; see Raven 2015 for
overview). Example: it is commonly thought that the existence of a set is
grounded in the existence of its members. Thus, the singleton tSocratesu
exists in virtue of Socrates’s existence. This seems to entail:
(28) If Socrates had not existed, tSocratesu would not have existed.
By contrast, it is not in virtue of 2 ` 2 being 4 that tSocratesu exists. This is
justified by the observation that (29) is false:
(29) If 2 ` 2 had not been 4, tSocratesu would not have existed.
So standard views on grounding seem to require nonvacuism.33
Some have even used nonvacuous counterpossibles to develop interven-
tionist accounts of grounding (Schaffer, 2016; Wilson, 2018; Khoo, forthcom-
ing).34 The idea behind these accounts is to introduce “grounding graphs”
33There has been little discussion as to how vacuists can account for metaphysical ex-
planation (though see Emery and Hill 2017). Wilson (2018, p. 725) suggests that vacuists
will naturally tend to be grounding skeptics, though his argument for this assumes the
correctness of the interventionist picture of grounding, which a grounding-friendly vacuist
may wish to dispute. It is interesting that Williamson, a prominent vacuist, has expressed
skepticism about truthmakers, albeit for different reasons (Williamson, 2013, §8.3).
34Such accounts have been explored extensively in the study of causation (Woodward,
2003; Pearl, 2009; Briggs, 2012). Fine’s (2012) truthmaker semantics closely resembles the
interventionist semantics (the former can even be seen as a generalization of the latter).
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representing the grounding relations. Such graphs consist of some vari-
ables representing the relata of grounding (facts, entities, propositions, etc.)
and structural equations representing the asymmetric counterfactual (often
counterpossible) dependencies between these. On this account, a counter-
factual is true iff upon “intervening” on the grounding graph to force the
antecedent to come out true, the consequent comes out as true. Baron et al.
(2017, 2020) develop a similar account of mathematical explanations.
Essence. It used to be thought that an object 𝑥 is essentially 𝐹 iff necessarily,
if 𝑥 exists, then 𝑥 is 𝐹. Fine (1994) famously pointed out counterexamples
to the right-to-left direction. For example, while it is essential to tSocratesu
that Socrates exist, it is not essential to Socrates that tSocratesu exists—it’s
not essential to Socrates that any sets exist. Yet, necessarily, Socrates exists iff
tSocratesu exists. Fine used this example and others to argue that necessity
should be analyzed in terms of essence, not the other way around.
Brogaard and Salerno (2007, 2013) argue that a modal analysis of essence
can be revived using counterpossibles. Their proposal: 𝑥 is essentially 𝐹 iff
(1) necessarily, if 𝑥 exists, then 𝑥 is 𝐹 (the old modal view), and (2) if there
had been no 𝐹s, 𝑥 would not exist. They say the reason it is not essential to
Socrates that tSocratesu exists is that the following is false (p. 646):
(30) If sets had not existed, Socrates would not have existed.
By contrast, the truth of (28) ensures that it’s essential to tSocratesu that
Socrates exists. This explanation requires nonvacuism.
The account needs refinement as it stands. First, Brogaard and Salerno
seem to misapply their account in examples like the above. The 𝐹 in question
is being such that tSocratesu exists. In that case, the relevant counterfactual is
not (30), but rather:35
(31) If tSocratesu had not existed, Socrates would not have existed.
This is not a counterpossible; but more importantly, it just seems true (Torza,
2015; Williamson, 2017; De, 2020). Second, Brogaard and Salerno predict
it’s essential to Socrates that he exists, which many take to be problematic
for the theory of essence (De, 2020).
35More accurately, the antecedent should be “If there had been no things such that
tSocratesu existed,. . . ”, but I assume it’s harmless to replace that with “If tSocratesu had
not existed,. . . ” in this context.
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Omissive Causation. One major question in the literature on causation con-
cerns causation by omission. Example: during the COVID-19 pandemic,
I never went to campus to water the plants in my office. Unsurprisingly,
they all withered and died. Arguably, my failure to water my plants caused
the plants to die. But it seems incorrect to say that your failure to water
my plants caused them to die. Why is your failure not causally responsible
when mine is?
A similar puzzle arises for impossible omissions. For example, imagine
that when Hobbes was trying to square the circle, there had been an award
for the first person to succeed at the task. Arguably, Hobbes’s failure to
square the circle (at least in part) caused the award to go unclaimed. But
Wallis (who refuted Hobbes’s alleged “proof”) also did not square the circle
(nor did he try). Yet it seems incorrect to say his failure to square the circle
in any way caused the award to go unclaimed.
Bernstein (2014, 2016) gives an analysis of omissive causation that can
account for impossible omissions. Very roughly, the reason my failure to
water my plants caused them to die is that (1) there’s a reasonably close
world where I do water my plants, and (2) had I watered my plants, they
would have lived. By contrast, there’s no reasonably close world where
you water my plants; so your failure to do so does not cause them to die.
Similarly, the reason Hobbes’s failure to square the circle caused the award
to go unclaimed is that (1) there’s a reasonably close (impossible) world
where Hobbes squares the circle, and (2) had Hobbes squared the circle, the
award would not have gone unclaimed. By contrast, there’s no reasonably
close world where Wallis squared the circle; so his failure to do so does not
cause the award to go unclaimed.
This account requires nonvacuism, for otherwise it would trivialize im-
possibly omissive causation—e.g., it would predict that if there’s a reason-
ably close world where Hobbes squares the circle, Hobbes’s failure to do
so would also cause world hunger to continue. It also requires rejecting
Strangeness of Impossibility, as Bernstein observes. Suppose Hobbes never
thought to bribe the award committee to give him the award. Then it seems
incorrect to say Hobbes’s failure to bribe the committee caused the award
to go unclaimed. Yet had Hobbes bribed the committee, the award would
not have gone unclaimed. So in this case, the possible world where Hobbes
bribes the committee is not close, even though the impossible world where
Hobbes squares the circle is. Hence, an impossible world must be closer to
the actual world than some possible world. Bernstein defends both of these
requirements as independently plausible.
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Theism. Zagzebski (1990, p. 180) observes that counterpossibles may be
crucial for resolving various puzzles concerning both God’s omnipotence
and God’s omniscience.36
Regarding the first: there is a tension in the claim that God is essen-
tially omnibenevolent and omnipotent (Carter, 1985). If God is essentially
omnibenevolent, then it is impossible for God to do evil; yet, this suggests
there are limits on God’s powers—after all, humans can do evil, so why can’t
God?37 In response, Morris (1986, p. 168) argues that while God couldn’t
have done evil in virtue of God’s good will, that doesn’t mean God is not
omnipotent, as the following is false (cf. Pearce and Pruss 2012; Pearce 2017):
(32) If God had wanted to do evil, God would not have been able to.
But, as Zagzebski points out, on Morris’s view, this is a counterpossible
precisely because God necessarily does not want to do evil. So this response
requires nonvacuism (see Wierenga 1998 for a rebuttal on behalf of the
vacuist-friendly theist).38
Regarding the second: there is a tension between the claim that God is
omniscient and the claim that we have free will. If God knows what you’re
going to do before you do it, then you cannot do otherwise. Zagzebski (1991,
pp. 159–161) proposes a solution to this problem on which one’s actions can
be free even if one couldn’t do otherwise. On this account, one’s actions
are free only if one would have done them even if noncasually necessitating
factors had not obtained. This means that my choices are free only if “my
choices do not counterfactually depend on God’s foreknowledge” (p. 162).
36There is also discussion over whether Aquinas’s views required nonvacuism. According
to Freddoso (1986, pp. 44-45), Aquinas held that “truth consists in a certain relation between
world and intellect, so that if per impossible there were no intellects, then even if other things
existed, there would be no truths”. Since God is necessarily an intellect, Freddoso argues
this must be a nontrivially true counterpossible (cf. Zagzebski 1990, p. 179). For criticism,
see Wierenga 1998, pp. 94–98.
37This is related to a common objection to divine command theory, viz., it predicts that
the following counterfactual is true since God’s command is identical with moral goodness.
(i) If God were to command us to torture kittens, we would be morally required to do
it.
Divine command theorists might respond by saying the counterfactual is actually a coun-
terpossible, so that while it is true, such acts are still necessarily evil. See Morriston 2009 for
discussion.
38Wierenga 1998, p. 99 argues that we do not need counterfactuals to articulate this differ-
ence: instead, it can be articulated using metaphysical dependence relations. However, as
we’ve seen, there are reasons to think nontrivial metaphysical dependence relations require
nonvacuism. See Lampert 2019 for further criticism.
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4 Philosophical Applications
For this condition to be nontrivial, we need counterfactuals of the following
form to be nontrivial:
(33) If God were not omniscient and had not believed that I would 𝜙 at 𝑡,
I would still 𝜙 at 𝑡.
Fiction(alism). According to the Sherlock Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes
is a detective who lives at 221B Baker St. It also seems true that Sherlock
Holmes didn’t have a third nostril. Yet the stories never explicitly rule this
out: there are worlds compatible with everything the Holmes stories say
where Sherlock has a third nostril. How do we tell what’s true according to
a fiction beyond what it explicitly states?
Lewis (1978, p. 42) proposes an analysis of truth according to a fiction
roughly in terms of counterfactuals. The basic idea is this (although the
analysis undergoes several refinements): 𝐴 is true according to a fiction 𝐹
iff if 𝐹 had obtained, 𝐴 would have obtained. Thus, it’s still true according
to the Sherlock Holmes stories that Holmes does not have a third nostril
because had the Holmes stories obtained, Sherlock would not have a third
nostril (see Friend 2007 for an overview of the fiction operator approach).
Some fictions are impossible. For example, Lewis (1978, p. 46) observes
that in The Sign of Four, Watson has a war wound in his leg, whereas in
A Study in Scarlet, it’s in his shoulder. This seems like it might just be a
mistake, but in other cases, the impossibility is intentional. Priest (1997)
tells a fictional story where he finds an inconsistent object. I won’t spoil it;
suffice it to say, the inconsistent object plays an important role in the story
(see Nolan 2020 for discussion). Thus, one might naturally suggest that
Lewis’s theory of truth in fiction can be extended to give an account of truth
in impossible fictions—so long as nonvacuism is true.
Nonvacuous counterpossibles are also useful for fictionalists. According
to nominalism, abstract objects such as numbers do not exist. Nominalists
therefore deny that “3 is a prime number” is strictly speaking true. Nev-
ertheless, nominalists do not want to throw out all of mathematics: such
claims about numbers can still, in some sense, be correct. The strategy is to
paraphrase seemingly true sentences about numbers into nominalistically
acceptable sentences. Yet it is notoriously difficult to pull this off.
With nonvacuous counterpossibles, however, the task seems quite easy
(Dorr, 2008). We can paraphrase “3 is a prime number” as something like
the following:
(34) If there were numbers, 3 would be a prime number.
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In order for this paraphrase to work, the nominalist requires nonvacuism
to be true. Otherwise, the vacuous truth of (35) will predict that “3 is a
composite number” should be accepted:
(35) If there were numbers, 3 would be a composite number.
Similarly strategies could be employed for fictionalism about, e.g., possible
worlds (Rosen, 1990), composition (Rosen and Dorr, 2002), and (for monists)
decomposition (Schaffer, 2007).
One worry for this approach is that, very often, we want fictionalist
paraphrases to be closed under entailment. Thus, from (34), we want to be
able to infer:
(36) If there were numbers, there would be prime numbers.
We could guarantee the correctness of such reasoning if we could assume
counterpossibles are closed under entailment; but as we saw in our dis-
cussion of the thinking-it-through objection from §3.1, nonvacuists deny
this (Woodward, 2010). In response, nonvacuists might admit that even
though counterpossibles are not generally closed under entailment, fiction-
alist paraphrases are closed under some forms of entailment (Skiba, 2019).
5 Conclusion (and Some Open Questions)
Much of the debate over counterpossibles has been fixated on one basic
question: are counterpossibles ever false? We’ve surveyed the main options
proposed in the literature (vacuism: no; nonvacuism: yes; intermediate
views: it depends) and have looked at a variety of arguments for and
against each option. We also saw how each position could be fruitfully
employed to philosophical ends.
Details are still waiting to be filled in on all sides. Vacuists still have to
provide us with more specific pragmatic mechanisms that explain our abil-
ity to communicate with counterpossibles. Nonvacuists still have to supply
tractable accounts of similarity or related notions. Intermediate views go
some way towards addressing these concerns, but are still relatively new
and underdeveloped.
However, there is an asymmetry in terms of the work that remains to be
done. For vacuists, there seems little more to do apart from investigating the
pragmatics of counterpossibles and responding to specific objections. By
contrast, there are a number of open questions remaining for nonvacuists.
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For one, nonvacuists still need an account of the epistemology of coun-
terpossibles. Many nonvacuists hold that when it comes to the impossible,
anything goes: for every impossible proposition, there is an impossible
world where that proposition obtains (Nolan, 1997, p. 542). Given this, how
could we ever have reliable counterpossible knowledge? How could we ever
know what would happen if water were hydrogen peroxide, if Hobbes had
squared the circle, if it were raining and not raining, etc.? Moreover, does
it make sense to have credences in counterpossibles, even when we know
that the antecedent is impossible? And if so, when are such credences ratio-
nally justified? Perhaps one will say the epistemology of counterpossibles
is no more problematic than the epistemology of other counterfactuals; but
this requires some defense (especially in light of the “thinking it through”
objection from §3.1).39
Another major open question for nonvacuists concerns the logic of coun-
terfactuals. As we noted in §3.1, there is a worry that nonvacuism obliterates
any nontrivial logic of counterfactuals, which strikes many as counterintu-
itive. But even if we do not accept this, there is still unclarity as to which
principles, if any, should carry over from the logic of ordinary counterfac-
tuals to counterpossibles (see French et al. 2020 for an investigation of the
space of options). Furthermore, most work on the logic of counterpossibles
has focused on the logic of simple propositional languages. Relatively little
attention has been paid to the logic of counterpossibles with quantifiers.
There is also work to be done clarifying how similar or different the logic of
counterpossibles is to the logic of other opaque operators (belief operators,
grounding claims, etc.).
A final area of exploration I will mention concerns whether there are
any interesting differences between different types of counterpossibles. For
example, nonvacuists disagree over whether counterlogicals are a special
class of vacuous counterpossibles (Kocurek and Jerzak, 2021, p. 677). Per-
haps the same goes for counteranalyticals, but matters are less clear for
countermathematicals and counterconceptuals. It is also unclear whether
39One promising avenue is to tie the epistemology of counterfactuals to explanatory
reasoning (Kment, 2014). In addition, intermediate positions offer some hope towards
progress. For epistemic nonvacuists, counterpossible knowledge is only ever nontrivial on
epistemic readings. But it’s no mystery how we could have knowledge of counterpossibles
on their epistemic reading, since this is the reading that is relevantly tied to our epistemic state.
As for counterconventional nonvacuists, there is some hope that one might be able to reduce
our ability to know counterpossibles to a more general ability to reason about alternative
conventions or conceptual schemes (Kocurek and Jerzak, 2021, §7). More generally, we
might try to reduce our ability to know counterpossibles to our general capacity to imagine
the impossible (Kung, 2010, 2016).
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one should put countermetalogicals in the same class as counterlogicals,
especially since the former tend to be easier to interpret than the latter
(Sandgren and Tanaka, 2020). Thus far, the literature on counterpossibles
has tended to treat all counterpossibles the same. But it might be that certain
semantic, metaphysical, or epistemological issues can be addressed more
(or less) easily by different types of counterpossibles. Further investigation
will hopefully yield a better understanding of how different species within
the genus of counterpossibles relate.
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